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From the Ancient Silk Road to the Belt and Road 
Initiative: Narratives, signalling, and trust-building 
 
Abstract 
Narratives help in interpreting and understanding surrounding political 
realities. Yet, the divergence of narratives may also create distrust, and it 
is an important reason for greatly diverging perceptions of the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) between China and the international community. This 
paper explores how trust can be bridged between different narratives. It 
discusses the notions of trust and how the Chinese concept of ‘brightness’ 
contributes to a strategic signalling process for trust-building in strategic 
cooperation. This paper proposes that trust-building is a process of 
signalling and knowledge building. Only when the signal sent for strategic 
cooperation fits the other parties’ knowledge about the sender, can the 
trust-building process succeed. This compatibility between signals and 
developed knowledge can be the result of several rounds of signalling, in 
which the signal sender’s honesty regarding their self-interests and 
intentions is the necessary pre-condition.  
 
 





Narratives help people make sense of the world (Somers, 1994: 606), and 
in interpreting and understanding the surrounding political realities 
(Patterson and Monroe, 1998:321). These give people reasons to act 
(Franzosi, 1998), but at the same time act as ruling tools. From a post-
colonial perspective, Datta-Ray (2015) demonstrates how dominant 
Western diplomatic narratives suppress and marginalise India in important 
areas of international affairs, and he thus claims the need for India-oriented 
(non-western) narratives in diplomacy. Although China’s contemporary 
foreign policies are not usually interpreted in terms of post-colonial 
narratives, China faces a similar situation to India in suppression and 
marginalisation in diplomacy, and thus there is a similar demand for 




The problems China faces can be illustrated by attitudes surrounding the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). From the Chinese perspective, the BRI will 
enable China to engage with other fast emerging Asian markets through 
bilateral infrastructure and trade and investment cooperation, and allow 
these Asian countries to tap into China’s huge domestic market (Irshad et 
al., 2016) While China regards the BRI as a global public good, believing it 
will bring huge development to countries within the BRI scope, criticisms of 
the intentions and possible impacts of BRI projects have emerged in host 
countries and the rest of the world. A report in the Financial Times 
suggested that there are at least 234 BRI projects suffering setbacks, such 
as lack of social acceptance (Kygne, 2018).  
 
While many scholars attribute the low social acceptance of the BRI to 
technical issues (Russel and Berger, 2019; Yean, 2018; Liu and Lim, 2018; 
Baltensperger and Dadush, 2019), other scholars point to the divergence in 
perceptions of the BRI as the result of different political and economic 
narratives (Blanchard, 2018; Callahan, 2016; Sidaway and Woon, 2017). 
Failures, or slow progress, in project management of international 
investments are not rare in the era of globalisation, and do not inevitably 
have political consequences. A lack of understanding of the BRI signals from 
a different narrative background creates mistrust and misunderstanding 
(Yahuda 2013; Kynge, 2018; Juan, 2018). Yet as this article will argue, 
some strategic signals sent via the BRI have received greater acceptance 
than others sent via the same channel. 
 
This paper aims to address the question of how trust may be bridged across 
differing narratives in International Relations (IR) by linking the notion of 
strategic signalling with the Chinese concept of ‘brightness’. Specifically, 
what factors condition the success of strategic signals for trust-building? It 
argues that trust in strategic cooperation is the result of a series of signals 
and knowledge building where the signal sender’s honesty regarding self-
interests and intentions, acts as the conditional factor.  
 
Following this first introduction, the paper will be divided into three further 
sections. Section two discusses the notions of trust and how the strategic 
signalling process contributes to trust-building. The third section tests this 
framework with two case studies. One is the construction of the ancient Silk 
Road in around 139-114 B.C.E., when Zhang Qian of the Han dynasty 
connected China and Central Asia for the first time. The other is the modern 
BRI Launched in the 2010s. Both cases are regarded as initiatives by China 
in changing the regional order, and both encountered, or are encountering, 
problems originating from different narrative backgrounds. Section four 
concludes by explaining how the theories of strategic signalling and the 
notion of brightness could help build trust between China and the rest of 
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the world regarding the BRI project.  
SIGNALLING AND TRUST-BUILDING 
Trust is an important concept in the field of International Relations, 
especially in the processes of conflict resolution and peace-building between 
countries. Rousseau et al. (1998:395) define trust between two parties as 
‘a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based 
upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of another’. Others 
regard it as a part of rational decision-making preferences in relation to the 
external environment (Hollis, 1998:14). Hoffman (2002:366) argues that 
trust is a willingness to take risks on the behaviour of others, based on the 
belief that potential trustees will ‘do what is right’.   
 
Trust-building across narratives is difficult due to the divergence in 
perception between the senders and the receivers, and to the complexity of 
decision-making with regard to the interpersonal nature of trust-based 
relationships (Booth and Wheeler, 2008; Wheeler, 2012; Rathbun, 2011, 
2012). It is an incomplete information game (Kydd, 2000), and thus cannot 
be explained in the context of available information and specific reciprocity 
alone (Rathbun, 2011, 2012). However, trust-building is not impossible 
between states. Jervis (1976) argues that although misperception occurs 
far more frequently than is normally realised, the actors can try to minimise 
it by trying to see the world the way the other sees it, or by examining the 
world from varied perspectives.  
 
How is trust built? Signalling theory views trust development as a signalling 
process. Kydd (2000:333) states that ‘trust can be established and fostered 
by small, unilateral cooperative gestures that initiate chains of mutually 
rewarding behaviour’. These gestures are signals. This theory helps to 
describe the mode of behaviour of two nations in interaction (Breslin, 2018). 
 
However, not all signalling processes can generate trust. Received signals 
might lead to erroneous inferences. Senders may be able to deceive 
receivers by skilful use of signals; furthermore, contextual and/or 
reputational beliefs may differ in the extent to which they reflect the true 
intentions and abilities of senders (Jervis, 1976). Decision-makers tend to 
evaluate to what extent a signal reflects the true intention of the signal 
sender (Glaser, 2010). 
 
Scholars, therefore, place a strong emphasis on the significance of costly 
signals in broadcasting sincerity in cooperation (Glaser, 2010; Larson, 1997; 
Pu, 2017). Costly signals are gestures that involve a high cost to the sender 
in a reassurance game. In contrast to cheap signals that can be easily 
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retracted, players would not send (or at least would hesitate to send) costly 
signals if they were not sincere about their cooperation (Kydd, 2000). Costly 
signals, therefore, modify the expectation of the counterparties enabling 
cooperation (Kydd, 2005:187). For instance, the restrictive membership 
accession procedures of international institutions follow the logic of costly 
signalling by serving as filters that enable the candidate to prove their 
sincerity in seeking membership (Kydd, 2001:821).  
 
Fearon (1997) distinguishes two types of costly signals that states might 
use for communication purposes. Firstly, when players try to communicate 
willingness of cooperation, they can send signals that ‘tie their hands’ and 
limit room for manoeuvre. It increases ‘the costs of backing down if the 
would-be challenger actually challenges but otherwise entails no cost if no 
challenge materialises’ (Fearon, 1997:70). For example, when state leaders 
make a public statement, they send a ‘hand-tying’ signal by creating 
potential audience costs among their domestic political constituency. If their 
actions do not match their words, they risk domestic political opposition 
(Fearon, 1997). The other type of costly signal is one with a sunk cost. 
Sunk-cost signals are ‘actions costly for the state to take in the first place 
but do not affect the relative value of fighting versus acquiescing in a 
challenge’ (Fearon, 1997).  
 
However, there is still no guarantee that signals with high ‘hand-tying’ costs 
and sunk costs will always generate trust. The BRI appears to be a series 
of costly signals that involves both high ‘hand-tying’ costs considering its 
important position in China’s foreign policy, and high sunk cost through the 
numerous infrastructure investments overseas. Yet, BRI projects still suffer 
from low social acceptance in neighbouring countries. This example 
illustrates how current strategic signalling theories fail to explain the puzzle 
of trust-building.  
 
THE VIRTUE OF ‘BRIGHTNESS’ 
The Chinese Pre-Qin masters understood that trust-building between states 
is difficult. The key to trust-building is to avoid the risk of being deceived. 
Han Feizi states that for medium-size states, security cooperation with small 
states may not ensure their own survival, but cooperation with large states 
risks the chance of being deceived and thereby being controlled (Zhang, 
2006). In order to reduce risk in cooperation and to demonstrate their 
sincerity, states in the Spring and Autumn period exchanged princes 
(sometimes the crowned princes) as hostages. This kind of action can be 
regarded as sending costly signals for trust-building. Pre-Qin masters, 
however, also understood that costly signalling does not always guarantee 
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the success of trust-building. 
 
Zuo Qiuming, the pre-Qin historian author of Zuo Zhuan ( 左 传 ) has 
documented a case in which the King of Zhou and the Lord of Zheng 
exchange their sons as hostages to enhance their bilateral relationship; 
however, the Lord of Zheng still secretly sent troops to seize Zhou’s grain. 
Zuo Qiuming thus points out that ‘even with princes as hostages, there 
might not be sincere trust between states. If states dealt with others with 
brightness, and regulated their own behaviour according to ritual norms, 
the trust would be solid even without hostages’(Guo, 2016: 21).  
 
For the ancient Chinese, brightness (明) is an important quality of noble and 
virtuous men. Zhu Xi (朱熹 also known as Zhuzi), one of the most important 
Confucian scholars of the Song Dynasty, values ‘understanding the meaning 
of brightness’ as the first and the most important step of learning (Hu and 
Zhang, 2017). 
 
Brightness originally means the light, and everything that the light touches, 
and as a moral quality it requires rulers and virtuous men to be honest as 
to their intentions and to act in accordance with clear and transparent rules. 
Mencius indicates that if rulers can act in bright ways, even large states will 
be wary of challenging them (Liang 2015). Xunzi claims that with the virtue 
of brightness, kings can rule their countries well, establish good relations 
with other countries, and rule ‘All Under Heaven (Tianxia)’ (Zhang, 2012).  
 
The notion of brightness opposes the use of subterfuge and conspiracy in 
domestic politics and interstate relations. Xunzi states that if a state 
deceives its people for benefits, then the people will not be honest with the 
ruler; if the state deceives friendly states for self-benefit, it would not be 
able to deter rival states, or be trusted by the friendly states (Zhang, 2012). 
He further indicates that one can filch a state through tricks and 
conspiracies, but no one will be able to win ‘All Under Heaven’ by these 
means (Zhang, 2012). 
 
For ancient Chinese masters, acting in bright ways is believed to be the key 
to trust-building in strategic cooperation because it could reduce potential 
partners’ fears of being deceived. Using the language of modern IR theorists, 
honesty regarding self-interest and intentions could enhance the other 
party’s confidence in cooperation because it decreases the uncertainty in 
the incomplete information game as trust-building.  
 
This brightness, however, might not be automatically perceived by others. 
For strategic cooperative purposes, one state’s honesty regarding its self-
interest and intentions needs to be transformed into the other parties’ good 
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understanding of this state’s cooperative interests, and this transformation 
process can be easily disrupted, which is where the ancient Chinese masters 
are found lacking.    
SIGNALLING WITH ‘BRIGHTNESS’ 
To summarise the review of the literature above, the consensus among 
modern IR scholars and ancient Chinese masters is that the key to trust-
building is to decrease uncertainty in this incomplete information game. 
However, their emphases in trust-building process diverge. For strategic 
cooperative purposes, the judgment regarding whether a state will be 
trustworthy in a potential cooperation depends on two major factors. One 
is whether the signal sender might exploit others by backing down from 
cooperation once the proposal is accepted, which is a problem that costly 
signals can help resolve. The other factor is concern whether the signalled 
proposal reflects the true intention of the signal sender. The counterparties 
need to know that the signal sender does not have a hidden agenda. The 
ancient Chinese masters were conscious of these issues. 
 
This paper attempts to address these two issues in order to formulate a 
comprehensive understanding of the trust-building process. The proposed 
model makes two major assumptions. First, the existence of mutual interest 
determines whether there is a need for strategic cooperation. That is, both 
parties have the internal desire to achieve strategic cooperation. Second, 
the decision-makers are fully rational. They tend to trust their 
counterparties when they believe the risk of being deceived or exploited is 
low. Furthermore, they should also be able to independently reformulate 
and update their knowledge based on newly gathered information. 
 
This paper proposes that trust-building is a process of signalling and 
knowledge building. Only when the signal sent for strategic cooperation fits 
the receiver’s knowledge about the sender, thus generating a good 
understanding of the sender’s cooperative interests, can the trust-building 
process end in success. A good understanding of the sender’s cooperative 
interests means the receiver feels confident that the signal sender is willing 
and fully capable in fulfilling the cooperative responsibility. This good 
understanding can be the result of several rounds of signalling, in which the 






Figure 1, Trust-building as a process of signalling and knowledge 
building 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, Country B would not develop a good understanding 
of Country A’s cooperative interests and thus feel confident about the 
cooperation if A’s signal does not fit B’s original knowledge about A. This 
original knowledge could be the product of previous experiences, images, 
or stereotypes. Country B, therefore, will not trust Country A and thus 
decline the proposal. Yet, it may not be the end of the game. Taking the 
costly signals in this first round as one of the sources of new information, 
Country B may gather further information about Country A through various 
means such as, investigation, negotiation, or personal interactions between 
state leaders (Hall and Yarhi-Milo, 2012). New information would generate 
new knowledge about Country A. If Country A’s costly signals fit this newly 
developed knowledge, Country B would be able to develop a good 
understanding of Country A’s interest in cooperation and trust can thus be 
built. 
 
The signal sender’s honesty regarding their self-interest and intentions is 
the necessary condition for potential counterparties to generate a good 
understanding of the sender’s cooperative interests. Communication and 
cognitive theorists point out that people with high cognitive capability can 
avoid being misguided and make rational choices if they have access to 
multiple sources of information (Zucker, 1977; Zaller, 1992; De Vreese and 
Boogaarden, 2005, 2006). This argument suggests that it is difficult to 
manipulate others’ knowledge about a country, especially in a long-term 
trust-building process, because manipulated information will eventually be 
corrected by other information sources. 
 
This signalling and knowledge building process may end in three scenarios. 
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In the first scenario the signals in the following rounds fit the newly 
developed knowledge, and Country B’s understanding of Country A’s 
cooperative interests is improved. Trust might thus be built, and strategic 
cooperation achieved. In the second scenario Country B declines Country 
A’s proposal, and Country A stops sending signals in seeking for strategic 
cooperation because it has manipulated information in the previous rounds 
of signalling to hide its true cooperative interests and intentions. The more 
rounds of signalling it continues to conduct, the more manipulated 
information will be corrected in the knowledge building process, which will 
further erode any trust country B has in Country A. It will make cooperation 
unlikely. (3) Country A has been honest about its self-interests and 
intentions, but Country B’s knowledge building about Country A is still 
incomplete. Country A may choose to continue with further rounds of 
signalling, depending on the potential payoffs of cooperation and the costs 
of signalling. If the anticipated payoff is larger than the cost of signalling, 
the signalling process will likely continue; if not, Country A will choose to 
stop sending signals. Kydd (2000:340) puts this succinctly: ‘signals must 
be costly, but not too costly’. 
TWO ‘SILK ROAD’ CASES OF TRUST-BUILDING 
The Silk Road has never been a specific name for one road or route. It is a 
general notion referring to all routes that connected China, Central Asia, the 
Middle East, the Mediterranean region and Europe through which people 
exchanged commercial goods, ideas, technology, and culture. Although it 
has existed for more than two thousand years, its name ‘Silk Road’ was first 
used in 1877 by the German explorer Baron Ferdinan Von Richthofen (Wood, 
2002). This section examines two empirical cases where China has 
attempted to build trust across narratives for a change in regional order. 
Both cases are related to the idea of the ‘Silk Road’. The first case helps to 
illustrate how the dynamic signalling process and knowledge building led to 
the establishment of trust between states with different narrative 
backgrounds. The second case helps demonstrate the conditions of trust-
building in the signalling process. 
 
Case One: Ancient Silk Road in 139-114 B.C.E. 
 
Ancient China’s connection with Central Asia (the ‘Western Regions 西域’) 
started in the Han Dynasty (noted as ‘the Han’) and its earliest credible 
record (probably the only direct record) is found in the ‘Ranked Biographies 
of the Dayuan’ in the Records of the Grand Historian (also known in Chinese 
as the Shiji1; the term used to refer to this historical document from here 
                                                   
1 This paper uses Li Hanwen’s annotation to Shiji as the texts of analysis. (see Li, 2016) 
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on) written by the official historiographer Sima Qian (also translated as Ssu-
Ma Ch’ien).  
 
The northern nomads had long been a threat to Chinese kingdoms (Tong, 
1946, 2006; Beckwith, 2009; Liu 2010). In the early period of the Han 
Dynasty, the Xiongnu were in a dominant position in East-Central Asia, and 
the Han emperors had to resort to ‘He’qin’ with the Xiongnu (marrying off 
Han emperor’s sisters or daughters to chiefs of the Xiongnu) in order to 
make peace on their borders. However when the Emperor Wu of Han was 
in power, this strategy could no longer effectively prevent Xiongnu’s 
incursions into Han territory. The Han would often defeat the Xiongnu in 
battle, but these victories provided only temporary respite and could not 
prevent continued Xiongnu’s incursions (Zhang and Liu, 2015). 
 
Against this background, as Sima Qian commented, the Han needed allies 
in Central Asia as a counterbalance to the Xiongnu’s regional power and 
influence (Li, 2016). Such alliances would have obvious benefits to the Han 
in securing their borders. It is worth noting here that, although many 
researchers reveal the importance of connections between ancient China 
and Central Asia from economic and cultural perspectives, the original 
motivation for building these connections were strategic and security 
concerns. The Han needed allies to balance the threats from the Xiongnu, 
and this strategic objective remained the top priority of the Han’s 
relationship with Central Asian nations.  
Table 1: The three rounds of interaction between the Han and 
Central Asian nations 
 
Table 1 compares the interaction between the Han and Central Asian nations 
for the establishment of a strategic alliance. Three rounds of interaction can 
be identified. In the first round, Zhang Qian and his delegation left the Han 
territory and travelled west to find the Yuezhi. The Yuezhi had been invaded 









of the Han’s 
interests 
Consequence  
1 Yuezhi Yes  No  No  Failed  
2 Wu Sun 
and 
others 
Yes  Yes  No  Failed  
3 Wu Sun 
and 
others 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Succeeded  
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son led an exodus of the Yuezhi from their homelands, hoping for an 
opportunity for retaliation. The Han thus regarded the Yuezhi as a potential 
ally against Xiongnu (Li, 2016). However, having been captured and held by 
the Xiongnu, Zhang Qian was delayed in his arrival in Yuezhi territory. By 
the time he eventually arrived in Yuezhi territory, the Yuezhi had conquered 
the Da Xia, a Greek colony originally situated on the north bank of the Amu 
Darya River (Liu, 2010). The Yuezhi declined Zhang Qian’s alliance proposal 
on the pretext of having no interest in retaliation as their new territory was 
fertile and secure, far from the Xiongnu, and even further from the Han (Li, 
2016). However, while it might have been true that the Yuezhi were not 
interested in retaliation, they still had a shared interest with the Han in 
defending against the Xiongnu. This view is supported by the fact that they 
eventually sent envoys and built a relationship with the Han later in the 
third round of negotiation.  
 
In this first round, although the Han and the Yuezhi shared common 
interests in defending against the Xiongnu, the Yuezhi knew little of either 
the Han’s determination to fight against the Xiongnu or the Han’s military 
capability. Zhang Qian’s mission to the Yuezhi might have been unsuccessful 
due to the lack of a costly signal. Although Zhang Qian could prove his 
identity as an envoy of the Han, he was neither in a formal delegation nor 
offering considerable gifts after been captured by the Xiongnu troops (Li, 
2016). Therefore, the Yuezhi could not possibly formulate a good 
understanding of the Han’s interest in cooperation. It was, therefore, no 
surprise that the King of Yuezhi, suspecting deception, decided not to make 
an alliance with the Han. 
 
In the second round of signalling, the Han switched their attention from the 
Yuezhi to the Wu Sun. The Wu Sun were an independent state prior to being 
invaded by the Xiongnu’s troops. Kunmo, the King of Wu Sun, struggled to 
re-build Wu Sun’s independence; however, any independence he achieved 
was relative and fragile. Zhang Qian believed that the Han and the Wu Sun 
shared common interests in strategic terms, because the Han wanted 
additional support in deterring the Xiongnu, while the Wu Sun desired 
absolute independence from the Xiongnu’s control. He further suggested in 
his proposal to Emperor Wu of the Han that once the Han made an alliance 
with the Wu Sun, the Han could thereby build foreign relations with the Da 
Xia and other Central Asian nations (Li, 2016).  
 
Zhang Qian subsequently went to Central Asia for a second time. This time 
the Han sent costly signals to the Central Asian nations through a large 
delegation offering substantial valuable gifts. The Shiji records that the 
delegation had an entourage of 300, bringing 600 horses, tens of thousands 
of cows and sheep, and hundreds of thousands gifts made from precious 
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metals and cloths (Li, 2016). When Zhang Qian arrived in Wu Sun’s territory, 
he despatched his associate envoys to other Central Asian nations. These 
included the Dawan (in what is modern Ferghana in Uzbekistan, see Liu, 
2010), the Kangju (sometimes translated as Kangkeu, and located in what 
is now Tashkent and the Chu, Talas, and middle Jaxartes basins), the Yuezhi, 
the Da Xia (Darya), and the Anxi (Persia under the rule of the Parthians). 
 
Regardless of the costly signals that the Han sent with the large delegation 
and precious gifts, Kunmo, the chief of the Wu Sun still declined the Han’s 
proposal. He was not sure whether the Han were powerful enough to protect 
the Wu Sun from the Xiongnu. The Shiji records that as the Wu Sun were 
geographically distant from the Han, they had no knowledge of the Han’s 
capability; the Wu Sun were close to the Xiongnu and had been a dependent 
state of the latter for a considerable period; therefore, the Wu Sun nobles 
all feared the Xiongnu (Li, 2016). 
 
In other words, even with common interests and costly signals, the Wu Sun 
had not built knowledge about the Han that fitted the Han’s cooperative 
signals, and thus could not generate a good understanding of the Han’s 
strategic interests. As a result, the second round of signalling failed. 
 
In the third round, the Han repeated the signalling process and improved 
the Wu Sun’s understanding of the Han’s economic and military capabilities 
by inviting a delegation of the Wu Sun to visit the Han. The ‘Ranked 
Biographies of the Dayuan’ record that the Wu Sun envoys noted that the 
Han was rich and mighty with a huge population. They reported what they 
had seen to their King. The Wu Sun thereby started to take the Han’s 
proposal on strategic cooperation increasingly seriously. The following year, 
other Central Asian nations that Zhang Qian and his delegation had visited 
all sent envoys to the Han. The Han’s foreign relations with these states 
were consequently established in more formal ways (Li, 2016). Although 
not by strict definition bilateral military alliances, these foreign relations 
were of a similar nature. As the ‘Ranked Biographies of the Dayuan’ 
recorded, the Xiongnu took these actions as betrayal and planned an assault 
against the Wu Sun(Li, 2016). In other words, the Wu Sun’s decision to 
establish formal relations with the Han suggested that they were willing to 
accept the Han proposal to change the regional order in Central Asia.  
 
The success story of the third round of signalling cannot be separated from 
the first two rounds. Trust-building is a process of signalling and knowledge-
building. If the Han had not sent Zhang Qian to the Yuezhi and the Wu Sun, 
Central Asian nations could not possibly have known about the Han and the 
Han’s cooperative determination, and they would not send envoys to Han. 
However, it was only when the Wu Sun and other Central Asian nations 
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learnt of the Han’s economic and military capabilities that they were able 
to form a good understanding of Han strategic interests and, therefore, 
enter a collaboration based on trust.  
 
CASE TWO: BRI EMPOWERING CHINA AS A GLOBAL POWER 
 
President Xi Jinping first proposed establishing an economic belt across the 
trans-Eurasian region at Nazarbayev University in Astana, Kazakhstan on 7 
September 2013. Nicknamed ‘the new silk road’, the project would affect 3 
billion people in this region, in areas of conventional energy and mineral 
resources, and encompass collaboration in technology, investment, finance 
and services (Xinhua News, 2013). This message was quickly followed by a 
second speech in Indonesia on 3 October 2013 on the launch of the MSRI 
project. This project proposed to focus on China’s ASEAN neighbours for 
common development and prosperity (Xi, 2013:322).  
 
There have been two main trust-building signals delivered in relation to BRI 
projects, and they were clearly elaborated in President Xi’s three-and-half-
hour foreign strategies speech on 18 October 2017 at the 19th National 
Congress of the People’s Republic of China. One is the ‘economic and 
politically pro-activeness’ signal, the other is the ‘military conservativeness’ 
signal. This paper illustrates that the former signal is better accepted than 
the latter because it fits international audiences’ understanding of China’s 
interests better. 
 
The signal ‘economic and political pro-activeness’ is largely reflected by the 
concepts of ‘striving for achievement’ and a ‘community of a shared future 
for mankind’. This rhetoric suggests that China sees itself playing an 
increasingly influential role in global economic and political affairs. The BRI 
project is a continuation of China’s ‘opening up’ policy as it supports the 
expansion of Chinese enterprises abroad as a means to facilitate industrial 
upgrading at home. It is also intended as a means of increasing Chinese 
outward foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade, and in advancing the 
internationalisation of the Chinese currency (Babatunde, 2015:130-131). 
The importance of the BRI to Chinese government global strategy is 
undisputed as it was officially enshrined in the 19th National Party Congress 
(NPC) held in October 2017. The same congress where Xi delivered the 
above mentioned speech (Vangeli, 2018:59). The purpose of the BRI is 
therefore not only to impact the global political economy but also to change 
the way others relate to and think about the global political economy, their 
role in it, and their dialogue with China (Vangeli, 2018:59-60). This strategy 
is built upon a desire for a shift in authority in the global order, and in 
facilitating the emergence of a multipolar structure, rather than a 




Another signal that the BRI delivers is military conservativeness, which is 
mostly reflected by the concepts of a ‘community of a shared future’ and a 
‘new model of international relations’. The ancient Silk Road is a symbol of 
peace among the nations along the road, and China hopes to integrate this 
symbol into BRI projects. The notion of ‘peaceful development’ is a 
cornerstone of China’s foreign policies. However, in contrast to Hu Jintao’s 
‘peaceful development’, Xi’s signal of military conservativeness is 
characterised by a subtle shift from absolute pacifism and the principle of 
non-interference. Xi’s speech at the Central Bureau in 2013 indicates that 
China advocates dealing with international security issues through dialogue 
and negotiation, and to solve disputes with mutual trust, mutual 
understanding and mutual concession. However, this is qualified by a 
precondition that China’s core interests should not be violated (Qian and 
Liu, 2013). Xi’s speech at Geneva further suggests that China might 
intervene in international security crises if necessary. Xi states that ‘a 
country cannot have security while others around it are in turmoil, as 
threats facing other countries might affect it, too. When neighbours are in 
trouble, instead of strengthening one’s own fences, one should extend a 
helping hand to them… All countries should pursue common, comprehensive, 
cooperative and sustainable security’ (Xi, 2017a). This shift in relation to 
international intervention appears to be a response to previous criticisms 
from the West of Chinese inaction in international peacekeeping and crises 
settlement. 
 
How have international audiences responded to these two signals? This 
research examines commentaries on President Xi’s speech of 18 October 
2017 from all major English news publications in the Lexi-Nexis database, 
with publishing dates ranging from 18 October 2017 to 17 October 2018. 
There were in total 45 publications from 14 countries presenting relevant 
comments. This research mainly searches for commentary in English 
language sources, with some commentary in non-English speaking media 
in Japan, Thailand, and South Korea included in the analysis. The sampled 
publications may not, therefore, fully reflect general public opinion about 
BRI in these countries, or globally, but they help illustrate perceptions and 
responses to the two signals by global audiences in the given time period.    
 
Figure 2 illustrates the acceptance rate of the two signals among the 
samples. ‘Accept’ means the signal is accepted as it reflects the true 
intention of China. The result shows that nearly 60% of the sample agree 
that China’s signal of economic and political pro-activeness reflects China’s 
true intention, while less than 5% do ‘not accept’ the signal as China’s true 
intention. About 38% of the sample do not show a clear position. In contrast, 
the signal of military conservativeness is less accepted as reflecting China’s 
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true intention. Less than 5% of the sample accept this signal while more 
than 20% express a clear stance that they do not believe China will act in 
accordance with the signal of military conservativeness.  
 
Figure 2. Audience acceptance of the two signals 
 
Figure 3 shows how the audiences responded differently in their attitudes 
to the intended goals related to the two signals transmitted by Xi’s speech 
on 18 October 2017. Some international audiences might accept a signal as 
truly reflecting China’s intentions, but they might not welcome this changing 
role of China. Of the samples collected, 14 out of 45 welcomed China playing 
an increasing role in international politics, and some of the views were ‘very 
positive’. However, 10 samples express ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’ 
attitudes. In contrast, international audiences expressed more negative 
attitudes towards the signal of ‘military conservativeness’ than that of 
‘economic and political pro-activeness’. Only three out of 45 samples 
express positive attitudes to China’s signal of ‘military conservativeness’, 
while 21 samples express ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’ attitudes. 
 
Figure 3. Audience attitude towards Xi’s signals 
 
Table 2 compares the level of acceptance of the two strategic signals that 
China sent via Xi’s speeches related to the BRI. In terms of mutual interests, 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
economic and political proactiveness
military conservativeness
Acceptance rate of the signals
accept not accept neutral
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Economic and political proactiveness
Military conservativeness
Audiences' attitudes towards Xi's signals
very positive positive negative very negative neutral
15 
 
both China’s ‘economic pro-activeness’ and ‘military conservativeness’ fit 
other countries’ interests. The Asian Development Bank estimates the cost 
of infrastructure needs for development in the Asia-Pacific to reach around 
USD 26 trillion by 2030 (OECD, 2019). China’s huge investment in the BRI 
countries’ infrastructure and other projects can substantially contribute to 
the development of these countries. China also intends to be more involved 
in global and regional governance, which it sees as also benefiting BRI 
countries. China has also stated its intention to remain militarily 
conservative and has made promises of no military expansion. Xi’s speech 
in 2017 also states that China will provide protection when neighbours are 
threatened (Xi 2017b). This signal also fits neighbouring countries’ security 
interests. 
 
Table 2. Comparing the trust-building of the two signals 
 
 
Both ‘economic and political proactiveness’ and ‘military conservativeness’ 
are costly signals. For the signal of ‘economic and political proactiveness’, 
Xi’s speech at the 19th Congress of Chinese Communist Party states that ‘it 
will be an era that sees China moving closer to the centre stage and making 
greater contributions to mankind’ (Xi, 2017b). China has made enormous 
direct investments in BRI partner countries, containing the projects that 
relate to global governance in climate change, poverty, and marine 
governance (Xinhua News, 2019). These investments are the direct sunk 
cost of China’s signal on economic and political pro-activeness. 





Mutual interests  √ √ 
Costly signals √ √ 
Good understanding of 
interests 
Relatively good Relatively poor 
   
Acceptance (of samples) Acceptance Rate Acceptance Rate 
Accept   56.8% 4.4% 
Neutral rate  38.6% 73.3% 




For the signal of military conservativeness, President Xi and other Chinese 
leaders have repeatedly stated China’s determination in military 
conservativeness in many speeches internationally and domestically. For 
instance, Xi made a speech on the 70th anniversary of victory in the Anti-
Fascist War, promising that China will never seek a hegemonic position or 
expansion of her power and that China will never impose on other peoples 
its tragic experiences during that conflict (Xi, 2015). White Papers from 
Press Office of Ministry of National Defence also emphasize China’s 
essentially defensive strategy (Press Office of Ministry of National Defence 
of the PRC, 2010, 2015, 2019). These broadcasts can be seen as attaching 
high audience cost to the signal of ‘military conservativeness’.  
 
The sunk costs of ‘military conservativeness’ are also visibly high. To 
reinforce the peaceful role of the BRI and its relevant actors, and to move 
away from geopolitical and security concerns, China has stressed the 
deployment of military forces overseas only to deal with non-traditional 
security challenges along the BRI route, such as maritime search and rescue 
missions, piracy, drug trafficking and environmental risks (Chen et al, 2017). 
Deploying such defensive measures attaches a high sunk cost to the signal 
of ‘military conservativeness’. 
 
Despite the high ‘hand-tying’ and sunk costs, both signals are, in general, 
not well accepted by international audiences. Examining the samples of this 
research, there is still considerable scepticism of China’s true intentions. 
China’s opaque definition of its interest boundaries in BRI projects is the 
major reason. This problem has led to numbers of the comments examined 
taking a particularly negative view of the BRI. These see a hidden agenda, 
accusing China of interference in the domestic affairs of other countries 
through the creation of ‘debt traps.’ 
 
However, international audiences still respond differently to these two 
signals (see Figures 2 & 3). International audiences tend to interpret the 
‘economic and political pro-activeness’ signal as an indication of China’s 
quest for increasing economic and political influence internationally. The 
decline of US international leadership marked by the US withdrawal from 
several important international treaties and organisations has left a vacuum 
in international leadership. This worries many nations because they believe 
in the positive role of great powers in global governance. Therefore, China’s 
willingness to take on more responsibilities in international affairs, 
regardless of whether it can fill the vacuum left by the US or not, is seen as 
a positive development. More importantly, international audiences believe 
that growing international economic and political influence would largely 
benefit China’s grand strategic goal of the ‘rejuvenation of the Chinese 
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nation’. This signal fits international audiences’ understanding of China’s 
strategic interests. 
 
In contrast, the signal ‘military conservatism’ is more confusing to 
international audiences. China’s peaceful rise has been of mutual interest 
to China and the rest of world, at least until around 15 years ago. Yet how 
does the rise of a more powerful China in the future fit with other countries 
expectations, especially where ideological competition seems to be 
inevitable given China’s different path of development? The scepticism 
expressed in the comments examined mainly arise from China’s increasing 
military expenditure (Liu et al., 2019). Commentators are acutely aware of 
China’s increasingly muscular stance in the South China Sea, such as the 
construction of a man-made island and other new military facilities, and the 
denial of international arbitration. There is also concern over the 
development of overseas military harbours elsewhere. 
 
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been focusing on developing 
‘blue water’ capabilities to guarantee the security of the BRI (Fanell, 2019). 
The PLAN has also established a broader ‘security supply chain’ with Indian 
Ocean partners, for example, Pakistan and Bangladesh, and Middle Eastern 
and African countries (Ma, 2019). This not only improves its operational 
proficiency but also normalises its presence in this region (Wuthnow, 2017). 
However, while this rapid development of the PLAN along the BRI route is 
clear to many international observers, the increasing role and presence of 
the PLAN is often intentionally left out of Chinese official narratives. This 
lack of transparency increases the scepticism surrounding China’s motives.   
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper started with the puzzle of international audiences’ mistrust of 
China’s cooperative signal sending via the BRI, and it attempts to 
investigate how trust can be built across different narratives. It illustrates 
that trust-building is a continuing process of signalling and knowledge 
building. With the existence of common interests, only when the signals fit 
a counterparty’s knowledge about the signal sender, can they develop a 
good understanding of the sender’s cooperative interests and, therefore, 
trust the sender. In this process, the signal sender’s ‘brightness’ – that is, 
being honest regarding their self-interest and cooperative intentions - is the 
necessary condition whereby the signals can fit others’ knowledge.  
 
However, it is worth noting that this explanatory framework is valid only for 
a one-way signalling process where the signal sender and receiver are in an 
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asymmetric power relationship. In other words, the signal sender has 
minimal risk of exploitation by the receiver in their strategic cooperation.  
 
The two case studies help to demonstrate the dynamic nature of trust-
building in this one-way signalling process. In the first case study, when 
Zhang Qian and his delegation visited the Wu Sun and other Central Asian 
nations, they sent costly signals by bringing a huge amount of gifts that 
were intended to show the Han’s determination and sincerity in strategic 
cooperation against the Xiongnu. However, the Wu Sun and others decided 
not to trust the Han. The Wu Sun knew the Han’s interests in balancing the 
threat from the Xiongnu, but they were cautious about cooperating because 
they had little understanding of the capability of Han. The Wu Sun’s 
interests might be seriously harmed if the Han were weak and were seeking 
to deceive the Wu Sun to gain an ally to bear the brunt of an offensive 
against the Xiongnu. However, the Wu Sun’s knowledge of the Han 
concurred with the Han’s cooperative signal in the third round of signalling 
after the Wu Sun had sent envoys to the Han. This eventually led to an 
alliance between the Han and the Wu Sun. 
 
In the second case study of contemporary events, China has sent costly 
signals of cooperation by making huge infrastructure investments in BRI 
partner countries. However, these have not received the expected trust in 
return. The international audiences of the BRI are aware of China’s 
capabilities, but uncertain about its intentions. How and what benefits can 
China gain from its huge investments in BRI countries? This is the question 
that concerns international audiences. 
 
Therefore, China needs to further clarify its interests and intentions and to 
keep sending cooperative signals that help counterparties develop their 
knowledge of China and its cooperative interests if trust-building, and by 
extension the BRI, is to be successful. Moreover, China needs to be cautious 
about the ‘cost’ of its signals. If the cost of a signal appears higher than the 
perceived gain for China, international audiences will likely form a different 
interpretation of China’s cooperative interests, leading to a lack of trust. 
 
This paper has argued that trust in strategic cooperation is the result of a 
series of signalling and knowledge building initiatives in which the signal 
sender’s ‘brightness’ acts as a defining factor. While this trust-building 
process can decrease the risk for cooperating states in trusting the signal 
sender, it cannot guarantee this trust will never be betrayed. However, any 
betrayal would undermine the credibility of a signal sending state, which 
would have likely involve negative consequences for that state. For instance, 
Emperor Wu of the Han attempted to reshape the regional order in Central 
Asia by making alliances with the Wu Sun and other Central Asian nations. 
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However, this alliance was not honoured by later Han leaders, possibly 
because the Xiongnu confederacy disintegrated and they were no longer a 
threat to the Han. However, the Han’s failure to honour earlier commitments 
to its allies had serious consequences. The Central Asian nations turned 
against the Han, who had to wage numerous wars at enormous military and 
economic expense to secure their western border. This resulted in the 
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